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Abstract
T his paper depicts an industrial district as a center of innova­
tion and production in a sector characterized by horizontal prod­
uct differentiation. Local technological externalities sustain  the 
endogenous invention of new varieties by profit-seeking firms. A f­
ter invention, because a substantial fraction of their outp ut is 
dem anded by distant markets, firms face a crucial choice between  
reaching them  by exports or by FDIs. T he paper studies the ef­
fects that ‘g lobalization’ - in the form of lower trade costs and 
freer capital flows - has on this choice. In particular, it analizes 
the efficiency of firms decisions from the point o f  view  of the d is­
trict as a whole. It shows that in the decentralized outcom e firms 
engage in to o  much FDI and too  little  exportation when there are 
still substantial barriers to  trade and foreign investm ent, while 
the reverse is true when such barriers are lowered.
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Among the different modes of organizing the production process, great 
interest has been repeatedly attracted by the so-called Marshallian Indus­
trial District, henceforth MID (see, e.g., Sabel and Zeitlin, 1985; Sabel, 
1988; Best, 1990). The reason is simple: MIDs are often considered 
among the most successful agents in the economic landscape (Scott, 1988; 
Pyke et al., 1990). The most studied contemporary examples include the 
so-called Third Italy and Germany’s Baden-Württemberg in the EU as 
well as Route 128 and Silicon Valley in the US. However, similar indus­
trial clusters can be identified also elsewhere in Denmark, Sweden, Spain 
as well as in Los Angeles and copycats are pet projects of policy-makers 
worldwide (Porter, 1990; Saxenian, 1994).
Yet, despite its success, the MID has been recently put under strain 
by the so-called globalization, that is, by the ongoing reduction of barri­
ers to trade and factor mobility which is supposed to be leading towards 
the creation of a unique world market place where the actual locations 
of demand and supply is going to be immaterial (Nelson, 1993; OECD, 
1996). Prom the point of view of the district, globalization has at least 
two relevant dimensions (FYankel and Kahler, 1993). On the one hand, 
it may imply increased competition from other (possibly very distant) 
regional clusters. On the other hand, even if the MID faces no serious 
competitor in the global arena, globalization raises the issue of how to 
penetrate world markets. This paper investigates this second dimension 
and focuses on the choice between exportation and foreign direct invest­
ment (FDI). It argues that, by the very nature of the MID, its firms 
are bound to resort to a combination of exports and FDIs that is ineffi­
cient from the point of view of the district as a whole. However, before 
proceeding any further, it is necessary to clarify what we mean by MID.
In principle, a MID is “an organization of the production process 
based on single specialized industries, carried out by concentrations made 
up of many small firms of similar character in particular localities achiev­
ing the advantages of large-scale production by external rather than in­



























































































ties of people adhering to relatively homogeneous systems of values, and 
with networks of merging urban and rural settlements inside territories 
united by production and social links” (Sforzi, 1990). While this defin­
ition points at all the socio-economic subtleties of a MID, it would be 
futile to aim at presenting an integrated model capturing all its distinc­
tive features (Soubeyran and Thisse, 1999). Therefore we adopt here 
a streamlined approach and, for the purposes of the present analysis, 
we define a MID as a location that hosts a large number of small firms 
which produce similar goods for export and take advantage of the local­
ized accumulation of skills embodied in the resident labor force (Bellandi, 
1989).
From this narrower perspective, a MID is essentially an agglomera­
tion where several external effects are at work (Fujita and Thisse, 1996). 
First of all, there are technological externalities stemming from a col­
lective process of learning-by-doing fed by local interactions in the form 
of “informal discussions among workers in each firm, interfirm mobility 
of skilled workers, the exchange of ideas within families and clubs, and 
bandwagon effects” (Souberayn and Thisse, 1999). Secondarily, there 
are pecuniary externalities due to demand (‘backward’) and cost (‘for­
ward’) linkages between firms that arise from increasing returns to scale 
at plant level in the presence of trade costs (Fujita, Krugman and Ven­
ables, 1999). It is precisely the presence of all such externalities that 
makes a priori unlikely that individually rational decisions by firms will 
map into collectively optimal outcomes for the district.
In order to model the MID as an endogenously growing locale char­
acterized by both technological and pecuniary externalities, we build on 
the insights of one-sector models with local learning-by-doing (Bertola, 
1993; Souberayn and Thisse, 1999) as well as multi-sector models with 
localized product innovation (Walz, 1996; Martin and Ottaviano, 1999). 
In particular, we model growth as the result of research and develop­
ment (R&D) efforts carried out by profit-seeking firms located in the 
district that benefit from localized learning externalities (Romer, 1990; 
Grossman and Helpman, 1991).




























































































(Saxenian, 1994), firms in the MID are assumed to undergo a life-cycle. 
They are born as laboratories engaged in R&D inside the district, which 
is the only center of innovation. However, as soon as they have invented 
and patented a new differentiated blueprint, they quit R&D and start 
production to reap the corresponding monopoly rents. In this second 
phase of their life, firms are vertically integrated entities consisting of 
two units. A headquarter, which provides the services embedded in the 
blueprint, and a plant, which uses headquarter services to produce the 
final good. Headquarter services generate a fixed cost of production so 
that each firm’s technology exhibits overall increasing returns to scale 
(Markusen, 1995).
Due to nontransferable knowledge embodied in the local labor force 
(Teece, 1977), labs and headquarters can be located only in the district. 
On the contrary, plants can be established also abroad. We call national 
a firm that has both its headquarter and its plant in the district and 
multinational a firm that has its headquarter in the district and its plant 
abroad. While in the former case, foreign customers are supplied by 
exportation, in the latter they are reached through FDI. In both cases, 
due to barriers to trade and capital flows, foreign sales face additional 
costs with respect to home sales.
Innovation is modeled as a constant returns to scale activity char­
acterized by external economies of scale due to collective learning by the 
workforce of the MID. More precisely, we assume that the productivity 
of each R&D lab is an increasing function of the stock of blueprints that 
are not only invented but also implemented inside the district. This as­
sumptions is aimed at capturing the local positive feedback from plants 
to labs which characterize much of localized innovation processes (Lucas, 
1993; Martin and Ottaviano, 1999).
All this leads to the following results. First, as it is intuitive, high 
trade (FDI) barriers discourage exports (FDIs) and encourage FDIs (ex­
ports). Second, firms’ choices are generally suboptimal, but, third, they 
are not always biased in the same direction. In particular, we show that 
while for high levels of barriers to trade and FDI firms engage in too 




























































































riers. This inefficiency stems from the existence of three main external 
effects that firms do not take into account when choosing where to locate 
their plants. First, due to the local spillover from plants to labs, a firm’s 
plant location decision affects the productivity of R&D and, therefore, 
the rate of growth of the district (growth effect). Ceteris paribus, since 
such a spillover is positive, decentralized decision making would yield 
too many multinationals from the point of view of the MID as a whole. ’ 
Second, again due to the technological externality, a firm does not take 
into account its impact on the value of blueprints that exist initially in 
the district (wealth effect). As just pointed out, by locating its plant 
in the district, the firm increases the speed of innovation This reduces 
the value of the initial stock of blueprints and depletes the wealth of 
the district. Ceteris paribus, in equilibrium one would observe too few 
multinationals. Finally, due to the presence of trade costs, a firm does not 
realize that its plant location decision affects the intensity of competition 
in the MID beyond what is captured by its profits (competition effect). 
In particular, the decision of going multinational weakens competition 
in the district and generates welfare losses for local consumers. Ceteris 
paribus, this would lead to too many multinationals at the market out­
come. Therefore, the way the market mix of national and multinational 
firms departs from what is efficient for the district is determined by the 
balance between the growth and competition effects on the one side and 
the wealth effect on the other.
This explains the result. In general, due to technological spillovers, 
more local plants are good for growth. However, before drawing welfare 
implications, this straightforward intuition has to be qualified in view of 
the competition and wealth effects. When barriers are high, home and 
foreign markets are essentially isolated so that it makes a huge difference 
for competition inside the MID whether a firm goes multinational or 
not. Because the local market is sheltered against cheap reimports from 
foreign plants, competition would be much more feeble in the former case 
than in the latter. In other words, with high barriers the competition 
effect is strong and consumers in the district would like to have more 




























































































contrary, when barriers are low, from the point of view of competition 
and growth the location of plants is almost immaterial. The strongest 
effect is now on the wealth of the district. That is why, for low barriers, 
the district collectively favors FDIs over exports.
The remainder of the paper is organized in four parts. The first 
presents the model. The second finds the market equilibrium. The third 
discusses its welfare properties from the point of view of the MID as a 
whole. The fourth concludes.
2 T he m odel
There are two locations, the MID and the rest of the world. Variables 
pertaining to the district bear no label, while those belonging to the rest 
of the world are labeled by *. There is a unique factor of production, 
labor, whose total endowment L is distributed between locations so that 
a fraction XL of workers reside in the district with A e (0,1). Workers 
are geographically immobile and are employed in the production of two 
final goods: a homogenous good Y  and a composite good D consisting 
of N  horizontally differentiated varieties. The main difference between 
the district and the rest of the world is that in the former labor is also 
employed in an innovation sector which creates the blueprints that are 
necessary for the production of new varieties. Blueprints are protected 
by infinitely lived patents whose property belongs to the district. After 
registration, patented varieties can be produced either in the district 
to be exported to the rest of the world or directly in foreign markets 
and possibly reimported. Therefore, we assume that innovation happens 
exclusively in the MID, which is the engine of growth in the differentiated 
good sector.
Since the specification of the model is largely symmetric in most 
of its crucial features, we concentrate on the description of the MID.- 
Preferences are instantaneously Cobb-Douglas and intertemporally CES. 
with unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution:




























































































where Y(t) is the consumption flow of the homogeneous good at time 
f, p > 0 is the rate of time preference, and a  € (0,1) is the share of 
expenditures devoted to the consumption flow of the composite good 
D(t), which, following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), consists of a number of 
different varieties:
where c(s, t) is the consumption of variety s at instant f, N(t) is the total 
mass of varieties available in the economy at t, and a > 1 is the elasticity 
of substitution between varieties as well as the own-price elasticity of 
demand for each variety. As in Romer (1990) and in Grossman and 
Helpman (1991) growth will come from an endogenous increase in the 
variety of goods as measured by N(t).
To simplify notation, from now on we will drop the explicit time 
dependence of variables when this does not generate confusion. Accord­
ingly, thè value of expenditure E  is:
where py is the price of good Y, p(i) is the price of the i-th out of n 
varieties produced in the district, q(j) is the price of the j-th  out of n’ 
varieties produced abroad so that N = n + n".
As to the supply side, the homogenous good Y  is produced using 
labor with constant returns to scale in a perfectly competitive sector and 
it is freely traded between locations. Without loss of generality, the unit 
input requirement is set to 1 for convenience. It is assumed that the 
demand of this good in the whole economy is large enough that it cannot 
be satisfied by production in one place only.1 This hypothesis ensures 
that in equilibrium the homogenous good will be produced everywhere
'This will turn out to be the case in equilibrium if the expenditures share of 
good Y  is large enough, namely if a  <  pq/( 1 +  pq), where q is the cost parameter 
of innovation that will be introduced in the next paragraph. In what follows this 






























































































and, thus, because of free trade, the wage rates in the two locations will be 
the same. In addition, the assumption about the unit input requirement 
and the choice of Y  as the numeraire pin down the wage rate to 1 all 
over the economy.
The differentiated varieties of good D, which as already mentioned 
are protected by infinitely lived patents, are produced in a monopolis­
tically competitive sector. More precisely, the supply of each variety 
requires the use of the corresponding patent (the fixed cost at the source 
of economies of scale) for any scale of production and /3 units of labor 
for each unit of output. Consequently, production exhibits increasing 
returns to scale and this ensures that each firm will produce one and 
only one variety. Differently from the homogeneous good, trade in the 
differentiated varieties is costly. Following Samuelson (1954) trade costs 
are modelled as iceberg frictions: r  > 1 units have to be shipped for 
a unit delivery of any variety to the foreign market. Therefore, only a 
fraction of the shipped quantity is actually consumed. A value of r  = 1 
represents free trade, while in the limit, as r  —* oo, the district reaches 
autarky.
The MID is also active in the invention of new varieties of good D. 
R&D is modelled as a constant returns to scale activity carried out by 
perfectly competitive labs that use labor with a unit input requirement 
g/n. Such an assumption implies that the cost of innovation depends 
negatively on the number of plants located in the district and captures the 
presence of a learning curve that will be able to sustain growth in the long 
run (Martin and Ottaviano, 1999). This technological spillover is gener­
ated by local interactions between the people employed in innovation and 
those employed in production (Saxenian, 1994). Finally, for innovation 
to happen at all, some blueprints No are assumed to be owned by people 
in the MID right from the start. Only the profits accruing to this initial 
stock of blueprints are pure rents and contribute to the wealth of the 
district.
Research and development are performed by firms themselves, which 
then use the blueprints they have developed and patented to start pro­




























































































life-cycle. After being born as R&D labs, as soon as they have invented 
and patented a new blueprint, they leave R&D and start production to 
reap the corresponding operating profits. Because patents are infinitely 
lived, the second phase of their life lasts forever. In this phase, firms 
are vertically integrated entities consisting of two units. A headquarter, 
which provides the services embedded in the patented blueprint, and a 
plant, which uses headquarter services together with labor to produce the 
final good. Due to firm-specific know-how which is too costly to transmit, 
patents are not transferable to other firms.
While invention takes place only in the MID, the production process 
can be localized either in the district or abroad. In the former case, firms 
are national in scope and reach their foreign customers by exports incur­
ring the transport cost t . In the latter, they are multinational in that, 
while their headquarters remain in the district, their production facilities 
are located abroad. With only national firms, the pattern of intratem­
poral trade consists of intersectoral trade only with the district export­
ing the differentiated good D and importing the homogeneous good Y. 
With multinational firms, there are two additional kinds of intratemporal 
trade: intrafirm trade in patent services between headquarters and for­
eign plants; intraindustry trade of good D due to exports and reimports 
from foreign plants to the district.
Also the option of FDI incurs additional costs with respect to home 
sales. Such costs arise from various sources (Teece, 1977). First, there are 
problems which hamper the effective implementation of blueprints abroad 
due to tacit knowledge which might be difficult to transfer from the 
MID to foreign workers. Second, there is the difficulty of mastering and 
monitoring the operations of far plants due to alien business practices as 
well as cultural and linguistic differences. Third, there are administrative 
barriers that discourage foreign investment such as restrictions to profit 
repatriation as well as idiosyncratic laws and bureaucratic procedures 
whose handling cuts into the profitability of foreign plants. As in the 
case of trade costs, we model all these FDI costs as iceberg frictions: 
when a firm decides to set up its production facility abroad, it is able to 




























































































generates. The remaining fraction (1 — v) melts away.
Finally, to close the model we have to specify the institution that 
governs the intertemporal allocation of resources. We assume that there 
is a financial market where a safe bond is traded which bears an interest 
rate r in units of the numeraire. This market is where firms in the MID 
finance their investment in R&D and it is global in the sense that it is 
accessible by all consumers, no matter where they reside.
3 T he m arket equilibrium
The solution of the model is fairly standard (see, e.g., Grossman and 
Helpman, 1991). First, the intertemporal optimization by consumers 
implies that the growth rate of individual expenditures, E  and E ', is 
equal to the difference between the interest rate and the rate of time 
preference: E = E ' =  r — p.2
Second, the instantaneous allocation of expenditures attributes con­
stant shares a  and (1 — a) to the consumptions of good D and Y  respec­
tively and yields demand functions for each variety with constant elastic­
ity a. Thus, given wage equalization, profit-maximization by firms leads 
to producer prices (mill prices) that are the same for all varieties inde­
pendently from the places of production and sale: p = fia j{a — 1). This 
entails that consumers pay different prices on varieties supplied by firms 
in different places. In particular, they pay a lower price p = fia/{a — 1) 
for locally produced varieties and, due to trade costs, a higher price 
q = T0a/{a — 1) for imported varieties.
As a consequence, the operating profits of a typical production 
facility located in the district are:
f3x
7T = pX — 0X = ----- - (4)a — 1
2 From now on we follow the common convention according to which a dot or a hat 




























































































where x is the scale of output. In the same way, a foreign plant yields 
operating profits:
fix'7T* = PX* -  /?!* = — - (5)(7—1
but only a fraction u of them generates a cash flow for the corresponding 
firm.
Third, since the model is essentially an AK-model and, thus, it has 
no transitionary dynamics, its solution requires only the characteriza­
tion of the steady state. In order to proceed, it is useful to introduce 
some additional notation. In particular, let 7 € [0,1] be the share of 
varieties produced in the district so that (1 — 7) measures the share of 
multinationals among all firms. Then, a steady state of the model is de­
fined as an equilibrium where the geographic distribution of plants 7 is 
time-invariant and their total number grows at a constant rate g =N /N .
We begin the steady state analysis by discussing the equilibrium 
condition for the location of firms production plants 7. This can be 
derived from the market clearing conditions for the manufacturing sector, 
according to which the supply of each variety has to be equal to its 
demand (inclusive of trade costs) from consumers in both regions:
x = q ((7  — 1 )
Pa
L  XE
N  7 + <5(1 — 7) +
<5(1 -  A)£* ' 
67+ ( 1 - 7 ) (6)
= a(<7 -  1) L 6XE ( l - A) g *
Pa N  7 + 5 ( 1 - 7) 67+ ( 1 - 7 )
where 6 = r 1_<T is a measure of the freeness of trade ranging between 0 
in autarky and 1 with free trade.
For 7 to be constant, firms must have no incentive to relocate their 
plants. This can happen under three alternative scenarios. In the first, 
there are both local firms and multinationals, i.e. 7 € (0,1). For this 
to be the case, firms must be indifferent between producing in the MID 
or abroad and therefore blueprints must command the same operating 
profits (net of FDI costs) wherever they are implemented. That happens 





























































































allows us to solve (6) and (7) for y and x‘:
1 (1 -  6v)XE -  6(u -  6)(1 -  \)E*
7 ~ 1 -  <5 (1 -  6v)XE + [v -  6)(1 -  A)E*
. a ( a -  1) L A£ + (l -  A)£* x — ■ ■ ■ — —— ■1 -..... —
(3a N  vy + (1 — 7)
where 7 is bounded between 0 and 1 if and only if:
1/ — 6 __ A E 1 v — 6 
6 l - v 6  < (1 -  A )£* < 61 -1 /6
(9)
( 10)
In the second scenario, all plants are concentrated in the district, 
i.e. 7 =  1, so that there are no multinationals. For this outcome to be 
sustainable as a steady state, we need to have n > i/n*, which is the 
case if \E /(1  — \)E* > (1/ — 6) /6( 1 — v6). This inequality is likely to 
be satisfied whenever the cost of foreign investment is large with respect 
to trade costs (u is small when compared with 6) and it always holds if 
v — 6 < 0. It also holds if the district represents a relatively important 
market for its firms products (AE  is large when compared with (1 —\)E").
Finally, in the third scenario, all plants are located abroad, i.e. 
7 = 0, so that all firms are multinationals and the district is specialized 
in innovation and in the production of the homogeneous good. For this 
to be the case, Af?/(1 — A)E’ < 6(1/ — <5)/(l — v6) has to hold, which 
depicts this scenario as the mirror image of the previous one. Indeed, the 
foregoing inequality is likely to hold if the cost of foreign investment is 
small with respect to trade costs (1/ is large when compared with 6) and 
if the district is a relatively negligible market for its firms products (AE  
is small when compared with (1 — A)E*).
Condition (8) illustrates the ‘forward linkage’ at work in our model 
implying that, ceteris paribus, the geographic concentration of produc­
tion plants in the MID is increasing in the relative size of the local 
market. It also shows that, as it is intuitive, ceteris paribus an in­
crease in FDI barriers reduces the relative number of multinationals 
(dy/dv < 0). Less intuitive a priori is the impact of trade costs changes. 




























































































far as \E /{ \  — A)E’ < (v — <5)2/ (1 — 6v)2 which belongs to the accept­
able interval (10). Therefore, freer trade incentivates foreign investment 
against exportation, if FDI costs are small relatively to trade costs (1/ 
is large with respect to 6) as well as if the MID is' a relatively negli­
gible market for its own firms products (AE is small with respect to 
(1 — A)E'). The reason why is the so-called home-market effect (Help- 
man and Krugman, 1985) by which plants are (more than proportion­
ately) attracted by the larger market and the more so the lower the trade 
casts. Therefore, absent FDI costs, when the home market is the smaller 
one, lower trade costs make it more convenient for firms to locate in the 
larger foreign market and supply home consumers via reimports (since 
(u — 6)2/{\ — 6v )2 = 1 fori /= 1). On the contrary, when the home market 
is the larger one, lower trade costs incentivate firms to place their plants 
in the MID and to supply foreigners by exports. On top of that, the 
presence of FDI costs biases the result against the multinational option 
(since (i/ — 6)2/(  1 — 6v)2 < 1 for v < 1 when (8) holds).
Condition (9) shows how the profitability of firms is influenced by 
the geographical distribution of their plants. In particular, since it points 
out that x* and, therefore, x are decreasing in 7, it shows that, ceteris 
paribus, as more firms go multinational, operating profits fall worldwide. 
The more so, the larger the costs of FDI.
Turning now to the intertemporal equilibrium, let v be the value of 
a national firm. Then the condition of no-arbitrage-opportunity between 
investing in R&D and borrowing at the safe rate r implies:
V 7Tr = -  H—
V V
( 11)
where we have used the fact that, on a start-up investment of value v, the 
return is equal to the operating profits plus the change in the value of the 
firm. A similar condition must hold for the value v* of a multinational:
V 7Tr = ---- —
v‘ D* (12)




























































































It is useful to aggregate (11) and (12) across all firms to express the 
no arbitrage property as:
v , 7T7 +  7r*(l — 7 ) v [1/7 +  (1 — 7)]tt*r —— |-------------------- = —1----------------------  (1J)
v v v v
Because of perfect competition in the innovation sector, patents 
are priced at marginal cost, which gives the value of a firm v -  rj/n — 
t]/(^N). Because 7 is constant in steady state, after differencing, this 
yields v /v  — — N  / N  = —g. Because also consumers’ expenditures are 
constant in steady state, the interest rate r is equal to the rate of time 
preference p. Using all these results as well as (5) and (9) in (13), we 
find:
7 aL[XE + (1 — A)E*]
9 f) o
-  P (14)
Consider now the market clearing condition for labor which implies 
that the economy endowment of labor L is fully employed in R&D, in 
the homogeneous good sector and in the differentiated good sector:
L = ^ g  + ( 1 -  a)L[\E  + (1 -  X)E'\ + 0[yx + (1 -  7)1*] (15)
Condition (15) can be transformed by substituting for x = vx* and 
1* from (9) to obtain:
L = 1±g+ - — -LlXE  + (1 -  A)E*1 7 a (16)
Equations (14) and (16) can be solved together to express the steady 
state values of expenditures and the corresponding growth rate as func­
tions of 7 only:
(17)[XE + (1 -  X)E‘] = 1 +
7 L
and
a L 7 a — a
9 = -----------------Pa 77 a (18)
In (17) the first term on the right hand side is wage income, while 




























































































appears because, as previously noticed, only the operating profits accru­
ing to the initial stock of blueprints are pure rents. Because this stock is 
exclusively owned by people in the district, we have AE  = A + pri/^L and 
(1 — A)£’* = (1 — A). Equation (18) illustrates the positive externality at 
work in the model between production and innovation. An increase in 
the concentration of plants in the district decreases the cost of innova­
tion (because of local spillovers) pushing new labs to enter the innovation 
sector until profits in that sector are back to zero. This in turn increases 
the rate of innovation.
We are now ready to determine the steady state location of plants. 
It suffices to substitute the equilibrium values of expenditures into (8). 
This gives rise to a second order equation in 7 which admits only one 
positive solution. Its expression is readily obtained as:
7 =
—b + yjb2 + 4a(l — vb)frr] 
2a (19)
where a =  (1 — <5)[(1 —1̂ 6)A + (v — <5)(1 — A)]L and b =  {(1 — i/<5)(l — 6)prj — 
[(1 — ub)\ — b(u — <5)(1 — A)]L}. As already discussed, this corresponds 
to an interior steady state with 7 6 (0,1) whenever the difference in 
expenditures levels between the district and the rest of the world is not 
too pronounced, that is, by plugging equilibrium expenditures into (10), 
whenever:
v — <5 A + pq/'yL 1 v — b 
1 — v6 < 1 — A < <51 — 1/6 ( 20)
For most paremeters, comparative statics results have been stated 
when discussing equation (8) so that here we need to comment only on 
p and 77. They are both directly related to the equilibrium value of the 
initial stock of blueprints. Since such stock belongs to the MID, a fall in 
either parameter reduces the difference in expenditures between the two 
locations and, thus, decreases the share of plants that the district hosts.
Finally, the steady state growth rate of the economy can be found 




























































































4 W elfare analysis
There are a number of reasons why we should expect the market out­
come to be inefficient for the MID as a whole. They arise from the many 
distortions at work in the model. These can be classified in two main 
groups. To the first group belong those distortions which are not specific 
to the plant location problem we are studying, but pertain to the wider 
class of models with monopolistic competition and horizontal product 
innovation. First, revenues from producing a certain variety do not cap­
ture the corresponding consumer surplus. Second, the profit of a new 
variety does not, in general, correspond to the net change in total profits 
for the economy. Third, innovators are not aware of the positive spillover 
they generate to future R&D. Because such distortions are not specific 
to the present setting and have been studied at length by Grossman and 
Helpman (1991), we restrain from discussing them here and we focus on 
the second group of distortions. These are inherent to the plant location 
choices. First, there are technological spillovers from production plants 
to R&D labs. When going multinational, firms do not acknowledge the 
loss they provoke to the MID in terms of foregone positive externalities 
and lower growth rate (growth effect). From the point of view of the dis­
trict, this pulls towards too much FDI at the market equilibrium. Second, 
firms do not understand the impact of their plant location decisions on 
the wealth of people in the district. More precisely, by (17) more FDIs 
augment wealth by increasing the value of the initial stock of blueprints 
(wealth effect). This pulls towards insufficient FDIs. Third, there are 
pecuniary externalities, due to the presence of increasing returns and 
trade costs. When relocating, firms affect the intensity of competition, 
but they neglect this effect (competition effect). In particular, they do 
not realize that FDI increases the MID price index and therefore penalize 
local consumers. Again, this causes the market to overprovide FDIs.3
These three effects can be singled out by appropriate welfare analy­
sis. By calculating (1) in steady state, we can write the indirect utility
3The exact price index for the instantaneous Cobb-Douglas utility flow encapsu­




























































































of a representative resident in the district as a function of 7:
V = -p In | q° (1 -  a ) 1"» ( l  +  ^  j  { ^ )  N^ ' [(1 ~  6)7 +
(21)
where g is the steady state growth rate shown in (18) which also depends 
on 7. By differencing (21) with respect to 7, we obtain:
dV _ a2L 1 r? | a 1 - 6
d7 p2rj(r(a — 1) 7 7AL + pr) p(cr — 1) (1 — 6)7 4- 6
The three terms on the right hand side of (22) refer, respectively, to 
the growth, wealth and competition effects and have the expected signs.
To assess the desirability of the market combination of exports and 
FDIs in terms of MID welfare, we have to sign (22) at the equilibrium 
value of 7 given by (19). However, because the resulting expression is too 
complex to provide any valuable analytical insight, it is useful to look at 
the numerical examples summarized in Table 1. The first row, which we 
take as a benchmark case, presents a numerical example where, as shown 
by the last column, the district would benefit from a marginal reduction 
in 7, that is, by an increase in the relative number of multinationals, with 
respect to the market outcome. The other rows show how the results are 
sensitive to changes in parameter values. Quite intuitively, the MID gains 
from more FDIs if the welfare losses to consumers from slower growth 
and weaker competition are offset by the gain in terms of higher wealth. 
This is the case if competition is strong anyway (a large), if consumers 
care little about the differentiated good (a small) and about the future 
(p large), if the productivity of labor in innovation is low (7 large), if 
the global market is small (L small) and if the local market is negligible 
(A small). Under opposite circumstances, the district would instead gain 
from a reduction of FDIs in favor of more local production and exports.
More interestingly, the optimal mix of national and multinational 
firms depend on the level of barriers to trade and FDI. If such barriers are 
large (r large and 1/ small), then decentralized decision making generates 
too few exports and too many FDIs (dV/d-y > 0), while the reverse is 




























































































the model suggests the incapability of the MID to choose the best mix 
of exports and FDIs in order to penetrate foreign markets. As the econ­
omy gets more and more integrated firms turn from too much foreign 
investment to too much exportation.
This result can be explained in terms of the three aforementioned 
external effects. In general, due to technological spillovers, more local 
plants are good for growth. However, before drawing welfare implica­
tions, we have to take into account also the competition and wealth 
effects. When barriers are high, home and foreign markets are essen­
tially isolated so that it makes a huge difference for competition inside 
the MID whether a firm goes multinational or not. Because the local 
market is protected against cheap reimports from foreign plants, com­
petition would be much weaker in the former case than in the latter. 
In other words, with high barriers the competition effect is strong and 
consumers in the district would like to have more local production than 
what they get at the market equilibrium. On the contrary, when barriers 
are low, from the point of view of competition and growth the location of 
plants is almost immaterial. The strongest effect is now on the wealth of 
the district. That is why, for low barriers, the district collectively favors 
FDIs over exports.
5 C onclusion
Many externaTeffects are inherent to the very nature of a MID and, 
thus, individually rational decisions by its firms sire unlikely to map into 
collectively efficient outcomes for the district as a whole.
We have analyzed one particular choice that becomes crucial as the 
MID faces an economic environment where goods and factors are increas­
ingly mobile. It is the choice between exports and FDIs as a means to 
penetrate distant markets. We have pointed out that profit seeking be­
havior by firms does not take into account relevant external effects that 
influence the welfare of the district. Due to local technological spillovers 




























































































ties abroad slows down the pace of innovation (growth effect). Moreover, 
it relaxes the competition among local producers to the consumer surplus 
detriment (competition effect). On the other hand, for the same reason, 
it increases local wealth (wealth effect).
We have shown that, for high trade and FDI barriers, the miscal­
culation by firms of growth and competition effects dominates the one 
of the wealth effect so that the market outcome overprovides FDIs and 
underprovides exports. The reverse is true when obstacles to trade and 
FDI are low. In any case, decentralized decision making by firms results 
in suboptimal choices for the district as a whole.
These results call for additional research. Since we have modeled an 
economy where there is only one MID that supplies the world markets, a 
natural extension would be to investigate the case of competing districts. 
This would reveal the crucial importance of the internal cohesion of the 
MID. While this cohesion is likely to depend on economic factors (e.g., the 
type of goods produced, the input-output structure of network relations, 
the nature and intensity of spillovers), noneconomic factors (e.g., the 
homogeneity of the system of values, the intensity of social interactions, 
the propensity to job turnover) would also be central (Saxenian, 1994). 
As suggested by Soubeyran and Thisse (1999), modeling these latter 
factors would require the integration of more socio-economic variables 
into the analysis possibly along the lines drawn by Granovetter (1985) 
and Coate and Ravaillon (1993).
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a a V A L P T V ->(market) g(%) dV/d')
6 0.8 1 0.1 10 0.05 1.3 0.7 0.08 5.9 —9.5
5 - - - - - - - 0.07 6.8 12.7
- 0.9 - - - - - - 0.07 7.3 14.0
- - 0.8 - - - - - 0.07 6.8 2.1
- - - 0.11 - - - - 0.09 7.2 12.9
- - - - 15 - - - 0.06 7.5 14.3
- - - - - 0.04 - - 0.07 5.4 2.6
- - - - - - 1.2 - 0.07 4.8 -32.3
- - - - - - 1.4 - 0.09 8.4 23.5
- - - - - - - 0.8 0.05 2.7 -91.9
- - - - - - - 0.6 0.12 12.2 45.3
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